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## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 26 February 1972*


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NSA review completed

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month



NOVEMBER 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972  
Weekly data as reported





## US BATTLE DEATHS

increased from last week's 2 to 6, primarily due to casualties suffered in helicopter losses.









## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

climbed to 176 from last week's low figure of 139 which included the TET truce period. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the GVN.



## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

jumped to 219 following the 170 reported last week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

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Enemy Activity

In Vietnam there was a modest increase in enemy activity during the week in Military Regions (MR) 2 and 3, but elsewhere action remained at fairly low levels. All three infantry regiments of the 320th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division are now located in the border areas of the western highlands. The communists apparently are also moving additional artillery support in the form of heavy mortars (160mm) into this region. These mortars, coupled with the 122mm guns and howitzers which have probably been moved into the area and the 85mm guns previously identified there, give the enemy an impressive array of firepower. Overall, developments in the western highlands continue to make that area potentially the most explosive in the country. There are, however, still no firm indicators as to when the enemy plans to initiate major offensive activity. Further south, there are signs that elements of the Cambodian-based NVA 7th Division and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions may be shifting their areas of operations closer to the border of South Vietnam. These moves may foreshadow a communist thrust into South Vietnam's MR 3, but there is as yet insufficient evidence to support this position. The enemy may be making a feint designed to tie down ARVN's general reserve units in MR 3, and prevent them from being sent to MR 1 and MR 2 if large-scale combat activity flares up in these areas.

Enemy activity during the week in Laos was generally light. General Vang Pao's diversionary force operating on the southeastern edge of the Plaine des Jarres has run into stiff resistance and was forced to give up some ground at the end of the week. Action around Long Tieng itself has largely been confined to probing attacks along the Skyline Ridge. In the central Panhandle area, government forces attempting to retake Dong Hene have so far been unable to dislodge a well-entrenched enemy force. Elsewhere in southern Laos the situation has been very quiet.

In Cambodia during the week, enemy-initiated activity has also been light, consisting primarily of stand-off attacks by fire and small-scale ground probes. The most active area has been north of Phnom Penh in Kompong Thom Province. To the northwest, the FANK multi-battalion operation designated ANGKOR CHEY is continuing to make progress, and government forces have routed the enemy from several positions west, north, and east of Siem Reap.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The number of infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam rose to an estimated 89,300 - 91,300 with the acceptance of some 2,500 personnel during the week. [redacted]

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[redacted] The enemy continues to maintain a high level of logistics activity in support of his troops in the south.

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Communist Developments

Hanoi continues to show obvious displeasure over President Nixon's visit to China. The North Vietnamese have not even mentioned the trip in their media, but they have been vociferous in denouncing the President and his policies. An authoritative article in the Party paper Nhan Dan, without ever mentioning China by name, noted that the President was "trotting around the globe to peddle his peace philter," and added that "wherever he may go and whatever his guise, he will always be remembered as an aggressor bogged down and heavily defeated in Vietnam." (Even though it was clearly intended as a reassurance to Hanoi of Peking's continued backing, the Chinese statement in the joint communique expressing support for Hanoi's position and the 7-points has to date been ignored and not replayed by Hanoi media.)

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